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BALANCING THE NEEDS OF CITIES AND
PLAINTIFFS
STEVEN L. LEONARD*
Many of the nation's cities have become liable for their tortious
conduct.' Courts in thirty-seven states2 have abrogated general gov-
ernmental immunity for their cities, while only six have retained the
purest traditional forms.3 Just six years ago, the figures were twenty-
five and eight, respectively.'
From personal injury to negligent decisionmaking, from misfea-
sance in office to the intentional torts, a city may face wide exposure
to varied causes of action.5 While exposure can be direct,6 or arise
* B.S., University of Missouri-St. Louis, 1976; J.D. expected, Washington Univer-
sity, 1979.
1. See Appendix supra. The Wyoming Supreme Court most recently joined the
ranks, abrogating municipal immunity in Oroz v. Board of County Comm'rs, 575
P.2d 1155 (Wyo. 1978).
2. See Appendix supra.
3. Id Additionally, seven states maintain full governmental immunity for their
cities except where the municipality purchases insurance. See notes 118-20 and ac-
companying text infra.
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895A (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973).
5. Id The range of municipal exposure to tort suit is indeed wide. The fire pro-
tective services bring up problems of negligence in fire fighting, maintenance of
equipment and destruction of property. Municipal medical services can create liabil-
ity for malpractice, improper standards for admissions or refusal to admit due to
overcrowding, and problems concerning care and custody of mental patients. Recrea-
tion facilities are often rugged and remote, and fraught with potential injury causes.
Police brutality, false arrest and imprisonment, harm done to bystanders, as well as
nonfeasance problems of failing to provide adequate protection open vast possibilities
of problems for suit. Kennedy & Lynch, Some Problems of a Sovereign Without Im-
munitv, 36 S. CAL. L. REV. 161, 185 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Kennedy & Lynch].
See also Cronan, Governmental lmmunity Abolished, 42 Mo. MUNICIPAL REv., No.
11, at 4-5 (1977) (describing such horribles as a $218,000 judgment against Salix,
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indirectly on a respondeat superior theory,7 the present trend toward
judicial abrogation of immunity threatens a municipality with great
potential liability.
As the decline of governmental immunity continues8 it leaves
many fears in the minds of municipal leaders-fears of excessive
judgments and fears of unmanageable financial planning problems.9
These concerns can be alleviated by the enactment, at the state level,
Iowa, which had only $100,000 of insurance coverage and a population of 387 to
absorb the balance).
As a result of Illinois' landmark decision in Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit
Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959) (abrogating governmental immuni-
ties), the state legislature was required to appropriate $750,000 in a special relief act
for defendant-Kaneland's unexpected liability. See D. MANDELKER & D. NETSCH,
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM, 871 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as D. MANDELKER & D. NETSCH]. See also, Van Alstyne, Government Tort
Liabiiit." A Decade of Change, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 919 [hereinafter cited as Van Al-
styne] (cities' greatest concern is the "crushing burden" of liability).
6. E.g., Monell v. Department of Social Services, 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978) (city liable
for civil rights infringements which arise from "governmental custom" and not on a
respondeat superior basis); Greenwood v. Evergreen Mines Co., 220 Minn. 296, 19
N.W.2d 726 (1945) (city liable for damages incurred in construction of a dam); Hen-
ning v. City of Casper, 50 Wyo. 1, 57 P.2d 1264 (1936) (cities subject to "personal
judgments"); 18 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 53.01a (3rd ed. 1977)
[hereinafter cited as E. MCQUILLIN].
7. See, e.g., Fisher v. City of Miami, 172 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1965) (city liable for
employee's tort); Bailey v. New York, 3 Hill 531 (N.Y. 1842) (leading case defining
governmental torts); E. MCQUILLAN, supra note 6, at §§ 53, 65.
8. See note 1 supra.
When Arkansas judicially abrogated sovereign immunity, Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark,
1239, 429 S.W.2d 45 (1968), its legislature reimposed immunities. 1977 Ark. Acts § 12-
2901. The enactment was held constitutional. Hardin v. City of Devalls Bluff, 256
Ark. 480, 508 S.W.2d 559 (1974). But see Hutchings v. Kraject, 34 Ill. 2d 379, 215
N.E.2d 274 (1966); Harvey v. Clyde Park Dist., 32 Ill. 2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 573 (1965)
(both holding blanket legislative reimposed immunities unconstitutional).
Missouri's supreme court recently imposed liability on its municipalities in Jones v.
State Highway Comm'n, 557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1977). The court gave the legislature
eleven months to enact protective or comprehensive legislation. Id at 23 1. The legis-
lative response, enacted as Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.600 (1978), reimposes immunities
except where waived by the purchase of insurance. However, this bill is only a "tem-
porary answer" to the tort immunity question. The Missouri Senate is currently stud-
ying alternative measures which better balance municipal needs for protection from
excessive judgements against the individual plaintiff's needs for compensation. RE-
PORT OF THE MISSOURI SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
(1979).




of a comprehensive Tort Claims Act. l ° Such an Act is warranted in
light of unsatisfactory developments following judicially-created gov-
ernmental liability, which often leave municipalities in untenable po-
sitions."1 Current law, both pre- and post-liability, stems from old
common law doctrines of governmental immunity replete with incon-
sistencies and anachronistic distinctions.12 There is a clear need' 3 for
comprehensive policy formulations from the state legislatures.
This Note will examine past doctrines of governmental tort immu-
nity law to discover their impact on modem municipal tort law. So-
lutions will be offered to guide the state law maker away from past
mistakes and toward a system that can provide tort claimants with a
means for relief while protecting municipalities from financial insta-
bility.
I. SOVEREIGN AND GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY-THE EVOLUTION
Governmental tort immunity is a doctrine distinct from, though
related to, sovereign tort immunity. Sovereign immunity as an ad-
junct of state sovereignty,' 4 directly protects a municipality in its
function as a political subdivision of the state. 5 Thus, since a city's
authority to enact ordinances must arise from a delegation of state
power, 6 the state's sovereign immunity attaches to the delegation.' 7
10. The term "Tort Claims Act" will be used throughout this Note as a collective
term for the varied legislative responses to municipal tort liability.
11. See note 5 supra, and note 74 infra.
12. See notes 43-54 and accompanying text infra.
13. See notes 43-70 and accompanying text infra.
14. Sovereign immunity was upheld in Osburn v. Bank of the United States, 22
U.S. 738, 846-49 (1824). See also W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 131 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as W. PROSSER]; Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sover-
eign lmmuniiv Doctrines, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515 (1977). But see note 27 infra; Larson
v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 696-705 (1949) (specific relief
generally obtainable from immune sovereigns, but never damages).
15. See E. MCQUILLAN, supra note 6, at § 10.03; Note, JudicialAbrogation of Gov-
ernmental and Sovereign Immunity 4 National Trend With a Pennsylvania Perspective,
78 DICK. L. REV. 365, 365-401 (1973) [hereinafter cited as DICKINSON Note].
16. Eg., O'Haver v. Montgomery, 120 Tenn. 448, 111 S.W. 449 (1908) (municipal
power to create misdemeanors must stem from legislative grant). See E. MCQUIL-
LAN, supra note 6, at §§ 2.08-2.09. Cf. Cooper v. Town of Valley Head, 212 Ala. 125,
101 So. 874 (1924) (state statutory requirements for ordinance authorization); Webb
City & Carterville Waterworks v. City of Carterville, 153 Mo. 128, 54 S.W. 557, 558-
59 (1899) (state limits on city taxation power).
17. See W. PROSSER, supra note 14, at 977-78.
1979]
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Other traditional municipal immunities, however, attach to locally-
originated activities. 8 For example, the authority to operate a mu-
nicipal golf course requires no state-power delegation 9 as it arises
from the city's corporate character. This latter class of activities, sim-
ilarly immune, are labeled "governmental" not sovereign in nature.
This Note will focus on the governmental side of this dichotomy, and
will not discuss tort immunities arising from such activities as munic-
ipal courts, whose authority is strictly sovereign.
Sovereign immunity was formed from an ancient mistake. Origi-
nally postulated as rex non potest peccare (the King can do no
wrong), the doctrine was actually intended to create a means of equi-
table relief against the King. The King must make reparation for his
errors; he could not be allowed to do wrong.2" The doctrine was
quickly up-ended and became, as we know it today, the basis for bar-
ring suit against the King or the government. 2
18. Griffin v. Salt Lake City, Ill Utah 94, 176 P.2d 156, 158-59 (1947). See D.
MANDELKER & D. NETSCH, supra note 5, at 856-57; Potter, Sovereign Immunity in
Pennsylvania. 4n Open Letter to Mr. Justice Pomeroy, 38 U. PI'r. L. REV. 185, 185
nn.2 & 3 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Potter].
19. See, e.g., Department of Treasury v. City of Evansville, 223 Ind. 435, 444, 60
N.E.2d 952, 955 (1945) (city ownership of golf course not sovereign in character);
State v. City Council of Helena, 102 Mont. 27, 34-35, 55 P.2d 671, 675 (1936) (govern-
mental functions arise out of the corporate character of the municipality). See gener-
ally E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 6, at §§ 2.08-2.09.
This sovereign-governmental dichotomy gave rise to the earliest judicial exception
to tort immunities: the governmental-proprietary distinction, discussed in the text ac-
companying notes 29-37 infra.
20. See D. MANDELKER & D. NETSCH, supra note 5, at 853. See also Engdahl,
Immunity and Accountabiliyfor Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REV.
1, 3-5 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Engdahl]; Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Of-
ficers.- Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Jaffe].
21. Engdahl, supra note 20, at 13.
Even if the foundations of governmental immunity are built on soft logic, more
tenacious support for the doctrine has developed through the years. Despite an intui-
tive feeling that governments should be responsible for their tortious conduct, at least
six rationales have emerged in support of governmental immunity. They are listed
below, followed by a synopsis of the usual counter-argument.
1) Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes said that there is neither logic nor practical
groundfor supporting a legal right of action against the authority which makes the law
upon which any right of action depends. Kawananahuan v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349,
353 (1907). Accord, Holcombe v. Georgia Milk Producers Confed., 188 Ga. 358, 362,
3 S.E.2d 705, 708 (1939). See also Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 57 (1953)
(Jackson, J., dissenting) ("it is not a tort for government to govern"); Cohens v. Vir-
ginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,411-12 (1821) (where Chief Justice Marshall summarily
declared immunity for all suits against the United States); Amelchenko v. Borough of




Tort immunity for local political entities may be traced to the
eighteenth century English case of Russell v. The Men of Devon,22
However, the separation of the branches of government should provide the mecha-
nism necessary to bring an action in the courts against the creators and enforcers of
the law. Judges are independent "architects of justice." They can and often do find
against sovereign irresponsibility. See 3 K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 25.01 (1958) [hereinafter cited as K. DAVIS]; notes 99-103 and accompanying text
infra. See generally Borchard, Government Responsibility in Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 757
(1927) [hereinafter cited as Borchard I1].
2) A sovereign cannot be sued without its consent. However, the city is a corporate
entity and is not itself sovereign. While the state's sovereignty is often imputed to the
city, it remains essentially a corporate entity. See E. MCQUILLAN, supra note 6, at
§ 1.58. See also Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 42 (1924)
[hereinafter cited as Borchard I].
3) "The King can do no wrong. " Not only is this old maxim operated in reverse,
see note 20 and accompanying text supra, it is anomalous in any democracy.
4) There is no specific municipalfund to pay tort judgements. There seems to be no
reason for one. Corporate municipalities are normally authorized to expend general
revenues for this purpose. Eg., MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 82-4335(b) (Supp. 1977).
See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-1 1 (Supp. 1977), which authorizes cities to raise
additional taxes to cover a tort judgment.
5) The public policy rationale behind the early English cases was that it is betterfor
the injured individual to bear the loss than to inconvenience the public. This harsh ra-
tionale is now uniformly rejected. See, e.g., Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit
Dist, No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 21, 163 N.E.2d 89, 94 (1959) (such a theory is "almost
incredible"). Cf. Abernathy v. Sisters of St. Mary's, 446 S.W.2d 599 (Mo. 1969) (en
banc) (this type of allocation of risk is inherently unfair).
6) Thefear of financial instability and destruction of local governments supports im-
munit, There is no empirical data to support the fear that judgments will impair
municipal functions. See Jones v. State Highway Comm'n, 557 S.W.2d 225, 229 (Mo.
1977) (suit against the Missouri Highway Department for negligence in highway de-
sign and maintenance). Also, many decisions abrogating immunity include a pro-
spective effective date, giving cities and state legislatures time to create precautionary
measures. See, e.g., Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621,264 Minn. 279, 118
N.W.2d 795 (1962) (making the effective date of liability the end of the next legisla-
tive session); Jones v. State Highway Comm'n, 557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1977) (allowing
eleven months for legislative action); Merrill v. City of Manchester, 114 N.H. 722, 332
A.2d 378 (1975) (allowing seven months for legislative action).
7) Perhaps a seventh rationale should be posited here. A government must per-
form certain functions for which no tort law "reasonable man" standard can apply.
Functions such as mass swine flu inoculations expose a government to liabilities far in
excess of normal expectations. Yet the very lack of a reasonable man standard forms
a basis on which to choose whether the actor-city should be held liable. See notes 80-
103 and accompanying text infra. See generally Comment, The Discretionary Function
Exception to Government Tort Liability, 61 MARQ. L. REV. 163, 165 (1977); Note,
Apportioning Liability in Mass Inoculations:.A Comparison of Two Views and a Look at
the Future, 6 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 239, 241-44 (1977).
22. 2 Term Rep. 667, 100 Eng. Rptr. 359 (1789). Although this case obviously was
decided after the Declaration of Independence, it is valuable as a statement of the
common law as adopted in the United States. DICKINSON Note, supra note 15, at 370.
19791
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
introduced into this country through the Massachusetts decision of
Mower v. The Inhabitants of Leicester.23 The English court based its
finding of immunity on Devon's unincorporated status and conse-
quent lack of a corporate fund from which to pay tort judgments.24
The Mower25 court relied on this same theory, even though Leicester
was incorporated, without offering an explanation.26
The harshness of the local government immunity doctrine led
courts to create numerous exceptions 27 such as the governmental-pro-
23. 9 Mass. 247 (1812).
24. The court failed to explain its requirement of a particular fund. 2 Term Rptr.
at 672-73, t00 Eng. Rptr. at 362.
25. 9 Mass. 247 (1812).
26. Id See Borchard I, supra note 21, at 41-42; D. MANDELKER & D. NETSCH,
supra note 5, at 853-54.
27. See W. PROSSER, supra note 14, at 978-79.
Governmental immunity has also been challenged on due process and equal pro-
tection grounds. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895A (Tent. Draft
No. 19, 1973). However, the due process argument has found no favor in the courts.
The argument was raised in an amicus curiae brief of the National Council of
Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. in Krause v. Ohio, 28 Ohio App. 2d 1, 274 N.E.2d
321 (1971), rev'd, 31 Ohio St. 2d 132, 285 N.E.2d 736, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1052
(1972) (suit arose out of the Kent State shootings; due process issue was not discussed
by any of the courts). See also Engdahl, supra note 20, at 77 n.372; Tribe, Intergo'ern-
mental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues
in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARv. L. REV. 682, 686-88 (1976).
The equal protection argument has gained only marginal success. An Ohio appel-
late court's holding of sovereign immunity as an improper classification of plaintiffs
with tort claims against governments was reversed by the Ohio Supreme Court. See
Krause v. State, 28 Ohio App. 2d 1, 6, 274 N.E.2d 321, 325 (1971), rev'd, 31 Ohio St.
2d 132, 285 N.E.2d 736, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1052 (1972).
Other state supreme courts have similarly denied equal protection challenges to
sovereign immunity. See Hardin v. City of Devalls Bluff. 256 Ark. 480. 508 S.W.2d
559 (1974) (upholding the legislative reimposition of governmental immunity after
judicial abrogation); County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. 2d 839, 846.
402 P.2d 868, 872, 44 Cal. Rptr. 796, 800 (1965) (upholding classification of plaintiffs
suing for injuries sustained in governmental mental institutions, as provided by CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 854.8 (Deering 1973)); Wall v. Sonora Union High School. 240 Cal.
App. 2d 870, 50 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1966) (upholding the denial of a claimed injury not
discoverable within the 100-day period required for notice to the defendant); Lunday
v. Vogelmann, 213 N.W.2d 904, 907 (Iowa 1973) (upholding classification as reason-
able); Brown v. Wichita State Univ., 219 Kan. 2, 547 P.2d 1015 (1976) (rejecting equal
protection arguments). Cf. Turner v. Staggs, 89 Nev. 230, 235, 510 P.2d 879, 882
(1973) (six-month notice requirement held an unreasonable classification); Reich v.
State Highway Dep't, 386 Mich. 617, 194 N.W.2d 700 (1972) (sixty-day statute of
limitations held an unreasonable classification). The Michigan Court, however, has




prietary distinction.28 Its genesis began with the recognition of the
dual character of municipal powers-sovereign and governmental.
The courts refused to immunize cities when they functioned in roles
similar to profit-making businesses. Distinctions between cities' gov-
erning activities (immune) and their for-profit proprietary activities
(liable in tort) became commonplace.29 Activities analogous to if not
in pari materia with the state's sovereignty, such as police protection
or municipal recreation activities,3" were immune from tort liability.
On the other hand, selling mineral water"l fell outside the special
class of governmental activities and became subject to tort liability.
One common test for municipal liability focused on the functional
purpose of the activity. A city using DC electricity for street lighting
undertook a governmental activity for the general public good.32 But
when the same city sold AC electricity to homeowners for municipal
gain, a profit-making venture resulted.33 Consequently, recovery was
allowed for injuries sustained by contact with the AC wires, while
denied for injuries from the DC wires on the same pole.34
Not surprisingly, the governmental-proprietary distinction led to
great confusion 35 and, as arbitrary line drawing intensified,36 com-
ment bodies. See Hanger v. State, 64 Mich. App. 572, 580 n.4, 236 N.W.2d 148, 152
n.4 (1975).
Notice requirements of short limitation also lead to incompletely investigated com-
plaints asking for arbitrarily high damages to protect against subsequently discovered
injuries. This practice may result in increased litigation. Comment, The Constitution-
ali of California's Public Entitv Tort Claims Statutes, 6 PAC. L.J. 30, 38-39 (1975).
28. See W. PROSSER, supra note 14, at 978-79.
29. Cities enjoyed a dual character as governmental subdivisions of the state and
as corporations due to their different functions. See W. PROSSER, supra note 14, at
977; note 7 supra. Cf K. DAvis, supra note 21, at § 25.01 (describing another line of
attack on immunity by an extended "taking" theory).
30. See Lively v. City of Blackfoot, 91 Idaho 80, 82, 416 P.2d 27, 29 (1966); Dan-
iels v. Kansas Highway Patrol, 206 Kan. 710, 712, 482 P.2d 46, 48 (1971) (both cases
hold the operation of police departments is governmental in nature and immune); E.
MCQUILLAN, supra note 6, at §§ 53.24, 53.30, 53.51; W. PROSSER, supra note 14, at
979. See also note 19 and accompanying text, supra.
31. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946).




35. See D. MANDELKER & D. NETSCH, supra note 5, at 857; Comment, Virginia's
Law of Sovereign lmmunio, An Overview, 12 U. RICH. L. REv. 429, 437 (1978).
36. Compare Griffin v. Salt Lake City, 111 Utah 94, 176 P.2d 156 (1947) (public
19791
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mentators increasingly attacked the theory.3 7 The time was ripe for
the demise of municipal tort immunity when the Illinois38 and Cali-
fornia3 9 Supreme Courts abolished the doctrine in their jurisdictions.
As noted above, judicial abolition of governmental immunity has
proliferated.4 °
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF POST-IMMUNITY COMMON LAW
The majority of states changing from municipal immunities in tort
have done so judicially.4' But whether accomplished judicially or
legislatively, the courts have developed a body of post-abrogation
law.42 This law, built in part on old common law doctrines,43 brings
with it new difficulties.
A. Uncertain Distinctions
Two state legislatures have deferred entirely to the judicial process
swimming pool was a proprietary function) with Ramirez v. Ogden City, 9 Utah 2d
102, 279 P.2d 463 (1955) (governmentally subsidized, non-profit community center
was a governmental function). The courts of the forty-eight states were in "irreconcil-
able conflict." K. DAVIS, supra note 21, at § 25.01.
37. Professor Borchard was the preeminent early author. Borchard, Governmental
Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 129, 221 (1924); Borchard, Government Responsibility
in Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 1, 757, 1039 (1926); Borchard, Government Responsibilit, in
Tort, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 577, 734 (1928). See also Leflar & Kantrowitz, Tort Liability
of the States, 29 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1363 (1954).
38. See Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Il. 2d 11, 163
N.E.2d 89 (1959) (where an incorporated school district lost its immunity in a case
arising from a school bus accident). See also Hickman, Municipal Tort Liability in
Illinois, 1961 U. ILL. L.F. 475.
39. See Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, I1 Cal.
Rptr. 89 (1961). See also Note, Sovereign Immunity.- Scope of Doctrine Severe!; Lim-
itedin Caifornia, 49 CAL. L. REv. 400 (1961). However, the New York Court of
Appeals earlier abolished municipal immunity in Bernadine v. City of New York,
294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604 (1945). Though this abolition precedes the Illinois and
California cases, the New York court said it was only construing the 17-year old state
Court of Claims Act, N.Y. CT. CL. AcT § 8 (Consol. 1976), as allowing suit against
municipalities in tort. See Van Alstyne, supra note 5, at 919. Cf. K. DAVIS, supra
note 21, at § 25.01 (describing the piecemeal legislative activity in this area).
40. See notes 1-4 and accompanying text supra.
41. See Appendix supra.
42. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 14, at 986-87. See also notes 44-54 and
accompanying text infra.
43. See, e.g., Thomas v. State Highway Dep't, 398 Mich. 1, 247 N.W.2d 530





for development of municipal tort liability doctrines. The Alabama
Supreme Court based its new governmental liability rule44 on a the-
ory that the legislature had eliminated immunity from a certain class
of entities. This legislative categorization, created sixty-eight years
before the court discovered it, opened some governmental activities
to liability as provided in the state constitution.45 Consequently, a
delineation of governmental tort liability turns on whether the gov-
ernmental defendant falls within the liable class.46 While this analy-
sis leaves municipal airports4" and boards of education4" immune,
county hospitals are liable, construed as a part of that hard to define
class." Such judicially drawn lines are as arbitrary as governmental-
proprietary distinctions.50
The Pennsylvania legislature did not act after its state supreme
court removed municipal tort immunity.5 The resultant uncertainty
allowed courts to interpret municipal punitive damage cases with
contrary results.52 Without a legislative prescription uncertain liabil-
44. Jackson v. City of Florence, 294 Ala. 592, 320 So. 2d 68 (1975).
45. Id at 597, 320 So. 2d at 72.
46. Scotti v. City of Birmingham, 337 So. 2d 350 (Ala. 1976).
47. Id. (the court viewed its abrogation of immunity as a proper construction of
the Alabama municipal corporation enabling act, now ALA. CODE tit. 4, § 11-40-1
(1977), which did not mention airports).
48. See Enterprise City Bd. of Educ. v. Miller, 348 So. 2d 782 (Ala. 1977) and
Simms v. Etowah County Bd. of Educ., 337 So. 2d 1310 (Ala. 1976) (construing city
and county boards of education acts, ALA. CODE tit. 16, §§ 11-12 & 8-40 (1977) re-
spectively, as separate from the municipal enabling act construed in Jackson, dis-
cussed at text accompanying note 44 supra).
49. Lorence v. Hospital Bd., 294 Ala. 614, 320 So. 2d 631 (1975) (unlike Jackson,
the court found a specific intent to make county hospital boards liable under ALA.
CODE tit. 22, § 204(24) (1958)).
50. See generally Comment, Contractual Reco veryfor Negligent Injury, 29 ALA. L.
REv. 517 (1978) (concluding that municipal tort liability law is confused and unset-
tled).
51. Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973) (recovery
for student injured in city school).
52. Compare Santucci v. Wincber Borough, 31 Som. L.J. 281 (1974) (city immune
from punitive damages) with Henninger v. Atlantic Refining Co., 282 F. Supp. 667
(E.D. Pa. 1967) (city liable in punitive damages). For a discussion of municipal liabil-
ity for punitive damages, see note 117 infra.
Additionally, a lower Pennsylvania court narrowed the scope of municipal liability
by establishing immunity for "high level" township officials, based on a discretionary-
ministerial argument. Wicks v. Milzoco Builders, Inc., 25 Pa. Commw. Ct. 340, 360
A.2d 250 (1976). See Sloan, Lessons in Constitutional Interpretation: Sovereign Immu-
19791
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
ity exists for such activities as police nonfeasance53 and officials' dis-
cretionary acts.54
From the developments of the law in Alabama and Pennsylvania it
is clear that a need exists for legislative definition of the scope of
governmental liability. Case by case common law development fails
to establish clear limits of liability.
B. Discretionary-Ministerial Distinctions
In government-liable states, courts usually retain a blanket immu-
nity for actions characterized as discretionary." This merely sub-
stitutes an immunity based on a characterization of the governmental
act as discretionary in place of an immunity which relied on the dif-
ference in the labels "governmental" and "proprietary." 57 The ease
by which this judicial sleight-of-hand can destroy, then re-create the
immunity, makes study of this development critical in understanding
governmental tort law.
By the discretionary-ministerial distinction any tortious conduct
arising from the exercise of officials' discretion is immune. Discre-
tionary acts, as opposed to those merely ministerial, require the em-
ployee to look at all the facts and act upon them in some manner of
his own choosing. These procedures are not mandated by law. 8
Ministerial acts, on the other hand, arise where a law or regulation
nity in Pennsylvania, 82 DICK. L. REv. 209 (1978). For a discussion of discretionary
immunity, see notes 55-73 & 79-104 and accompanying text infra.
53. Santucci v. Wincber Borough, 31 Som. L.J. 289, 293, 298 (1974) (while police
might be held liable for acts of nonfeasance, "it is very unclear where the abrogation
of the doctrine of sovereign immunity has left the state of Pennsylvania .... ).
54. See, e.g., Nido v. Chambers, 70 Pa. D. & C.2d 129, 134 (1975) (lack of clear
standard of discretionary immunity for "high public officials"). See also discussion of
discretionary immunity at text accompanying notes 79-104 infra.
55. E.g., Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239,429 S.W.2d 45 (1968); Muskopfv. Coming
Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961); Spanel v. Mounds
View School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962); Jones v. State Highway
Comm'n, 557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1977).
56. For a thorough discussion of acts usually classed as discretionary or ministe-
rial, see E. MCQUILLAN, supra note 6, at § 53.22a-g.
57. E.g., Partain v. Maddox, 131 Ga. App. 778, 781-84, 206 S.E.2d 618, 620-22
(1974).
58. See e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Key West v. Filer, 107 Fla. 526, 534, 145 So. 204,
207 (1933). See also Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L.




imposes a duty to perform at a designated time and place.59 In other
words, discretionary acts are those which result in the exercise of the
discretion vested in the employee;6" ministerial acts are those acts in
which the employee does not use his own judgment.61
Unfortunately, these definitional approaches are circuitous and
often not mutually exclusive. No ministerial act is wholly without an
element of judgment--even the driving of a nail involves some dis-
cretion.62 However difficult to define, the implication of the discre-
tionary-ministerial distinction is clear: discretion involves policy
formulation while administration consists of policy execution.63
The essence of discretionary immunity is belief in the integrity of
the executive or quasi-judicial function 64 - the act of governing. The
discretionary-ministerial distinction, therefore, is little more than the
59. Jennings, supra note 58, at 297.
60. Comment, Discretionary Immunitr in California in the Aftermath of Johnson v.
State, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 454, 458 (1975).
61. Id
62. Ham v. Los Angeles County, 46 Cal. App. 148, 162, 189 P. 462, 468 (1920).
Many states reject the definitional approach for discretionary activities. E.g., State
v. Abbott, 498 P.2d 712, 717-26 (Alaska 1972); Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 793,
447 P.2d 352, 360, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 248 (1968); Rogers v. State, 51 Haw. 293, 298,
459 P.2d 378, 381-82 (1969). But the cure can be worse than the illness. Florida's
rejection of the old definitional approach led, in the course of three decisions, to an
increasingly rigid, formulated approach. See Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96
So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957) (policeman and municipal employer liable through respondeat
superior in a wrongful death case); Modlin v. City of Miami Beach, 201 So. 2d 70
(Fla. 1967) (narrowing employee and employer liability through respondeat superior
in a wrongful death action); Wong v. City of Miami, 237 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 1970) (an
almost unexplained grant of immunity to policemen and municipal employers in a
negligence case). SeeComment, The Discretionarv Function Exception to Government
Tort Liabilitv, 61 MARQ. L. REV. 163, 178-82 (1977).
Of course, rigidity is not the necessary end result of rejecting the old definitions in
favor of new formulas. Oregon's judicially devised formula, a five-part test, repre-
sents a flexible approach. See Smith v. Cooper, 256 Or. 485, 475 P.2d 78 (1970) (the
five factors are: 1) the importance of the allegedly discretionary act to the public
function; 2) the extent which liability would impair that function; 3) the availability of
other remedies; 4) whether discretion, literally was involved; and most importantly 5)
considerations of separation of powers). See also Evangelical United Brethren
Church v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 246, 407 P.2d 440 (1965) (balancing considerations in-
clude how basic the policy or program involved is to government goals, whether the
acts in question are essential to achieve those policies or programs, whether there was
an exercise of evaluation, judgment, or expertise, and whether the acts were made
with constitutional, statutory or lawful authority).
63. D. MANDELKER & D. NETSCH, supra note 5, at 859.
64. See notes 81-104 and accompanying text infra.
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old unsatisfactory governmental-proprietary rationale.65 In mechan-
ically maintaining local government's sovereignty in governing, the
rationale underlying the governmental-propriety cases, 66 the courts
have failed to see that administrative acts can be appropriately re-
viewed without improper judicial interference. Though the means
for accomplishing this will be developed later,67 it is evident that by
ignoring the ease with which government agents can injure the citi-
zenry,6" the doctrine grants a virtual unlimited immunity sounding in
the old, discarded governing or profit-making dichotomy. The dis-
cretionary doctrine thus becomes another special tort rule to protect
governments, in opposition to the modern trend toward municipal
accountability. 69 And as could be expected, the lines between discre-
tion and administration are indistinctly drawn.7°
The progressive view favors elimination of discretionary immu-
nity. One argument is economic: if society is to make sound deci-
sions regarding the risk-benefit trade-offs of its programs,7 it must
know all the costs involved. Shifting the burden of tortious conduct
of discretionary decisionmakers to the injured citizen effectively hides
part of the cost of that activity.7" It is more economically proper, and
fits with the modern enterprise theory of paying the "full cost" of
doing business, 73 that a municipality be responsible for the foresee-
able injuries of its activities.
65. See K. DAVIS, supra note 21, at § 25.11; notes 28-34 and accompanying text
supra. But see Comment, The Discretionary Function Exception to Government Tort
Liability, 61 MARQ. L. REV. 163, 167 (1977).
66. See notes 28-36 and accompanying text supra.
67. See notes 81-104 and accompanying text infra.
68. See notes 28-36 and accompanying text supra.
69. Van Alstyne, supra note 5, at 974-75.
70. Haslund v. Seattle, 86 Wash. 2d 607, 547 P.2d 1221 (1976) (takes a narrow
view of the discretionary immunity). Compare D. MANDELKER & D. NETSCH, supra
note 5, at 1085 with Lansing, The King Can Do Wrong! The Oregon Tort Claims Act,
47 OR. L. REV. 357, 359 (1968) (governmental immunities should be broadly pro-
tected) [hereinafter cited as Lansing] and Mosk, The Many Problems of Sovereign Lia-
biiity, 3 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 7, 12 (1966) (courts have traditionally been too eager in
finding discretionary immunity).
71. See text accompanying note 128 infra.
72. Note, The Discretionary Exception and Municipal Tort Liabili': A Reap-
praisal, 52 MINN. L. REV. 1047, 1057 (1968).
73. R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM 115
(1967); James, Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U. CI. L.





Judicial development of post-governmental liability law fails to
create a concise and wholly satisfactory doctrine. Conflicting judicial
opinions" and the substitution of discretionary-ministerial distinc-
tions for discredited governmental-proprietary dichotomies75 demon-
strates that the current status of government tort law is no more
progressive than in prior years. Tort immunity law demands a legis-
lative response to balance the governmental and public interests.76 A
well drafted Tort Claims Act offers the basis for such a balance.
III. THE TORT CLAIMS ACT
State courts of last resort are more forceful in opening municipali-
ties to the claims of injured citizens than are legislatures restrained by
politics and inertia. 77 Yet because court decisions lack the particular-
ity of the usual legislation in this field, there is a clear need for a
74. Compare Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457 11
Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961) (court maintained discretionary immunities even while creating
governmental liability) with Breiner v. C & P Home Builders, Inc., 536 F.2d 27, 30 (3d
Cir. 1976) (court interpreted the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's abrogation of munici-
pal immunity as wholly eliminating discretionary immunity).
75. See, e.g., Hoy v. Capelli, 48 N.J. 81, 90, 222 A.2d 649, 654 (1966) (evaluation
of discretionary immunities using a governmental-proprietary analysis).
76. The policy consideration can be summed up as a clash between the philoso-
phy that "no men are above the law. . . that color of office creates no immunity for
the wrongful invasion of another's rights" against the tenacious principle of govern-
mental immunity. Jennings, supra note 58, at 263. On the plaintiff-defendant level,
the conflict is between the desire to protect victims of governmental torts and the need
to protect local governments from liability incurred in operating programs designed
to benefit the community. See Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School Dist., 55 Cal.
2d 224, 359 P.2d 465, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1961) (stating that in some instances it is unfair
for injured plaintiffs to carry the burden of governmental torts).
Of course, an imaginative attorney can often find relief for his client against an
immune municipal defendant. For example, in Alabama, before its abrogation of
municipal and county immunities, see notes 49-50 and accompanying text supra, a
plaintiff found relief for the tortious wrongful death of her baby. Eschewing a tort
claim, plaintiff alleged an implied contract for proper nursing and care for the expec-
tant mother and newborn child. The court held that the county hospital liable for
breach of its contractual duties. Paul v. Escambia County Hosp. Bd., 283 Ala. 488,
218 So. 2d 817 (1969). Another plaintiff successfully brought a similar contract action
against an immune municipal hospital in Berry v. Druid City Hosp. Bd., 333 So. 2d
796 (Ala. 1976).
77. Keeton, Creative Continuit, in the Law of Torts, 75 HARV. L. REv. 463, 473-75
(1962).
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legislative response."
A. Legislative Answers to the Discretionary-Ministerial Problem
Certainly, a legislative answer to the discretionary-ministerial dis-
tinction problem can and should be developed. Most legislatures en-
countering this subject have reestablished blanket discretionary
immunities.79 However, there are alternatives that can be utilized by
the legislature to give governments adequate protection to freely
make vital decisions without wholly depriving injured citizens of a
means of recovery. The legislature should consider each alternative
available, and through its deliberations satisfy its duty to consider all
competing interests.8 °
Three basic rationales are commonly asserted in support of discre-
tionary immunity:8' 1) fairness to the decisionmaker; 2) encourage-
ment of enthusiastic, aggressive public service; and 3) separation of
powers.
The fairness consideration inquires whether it is proper to require
administrators to make discretionary decisions and then subject the
government to liability for the results of those decisions.82 Such a
rationale equates the discretionary duties of executive and quasi-judi-
cial government employees with the firmly grounded discretionary
immunity of the judiciary.83 Since a judge is not accountable in tort
for his exercise of discretion, the argument goes, persons exercising
quasi-judicial powers should be similarly immune. Therefore, when
78. The Pennsylvania Insurance Department indicates that a comprehensive tort
claims act would alleviate current unpredictability in municipal tort liability. Letter
to the author, from Department of Insurance, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania dated
February 28, 1978. See also Potter, supra note 18, at 187-89.
79. Eg., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 820.2 (Deering 1973). See W. PROSSER, supra note
14, at § 132. Generally, however, the exercise of discretion with malice or bad faith
will make the government tortfeasor personally liable. D. MANDELKER & D.
NETSCH, supra note 5, at 1086.
While some legislative inroads do little more than control liability litigation proce-
dure, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 8-12-20 (1976), others extensively cover procedure, recov-
ery, and definitions of liability and immunity. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815
(Deering 1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, § 1-101 (Smith-Hurd 1966).
80. See note 76 supra.
8 1. Note, Utah GovernmentalImmunity Act: An 4nalysis, 1967 UTAH L. REV. 120.
133-34.
82. Jaffe, supra note 20, at 223. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1973)
(dicta that the Ohio governor may be hampered by the imposition of tort liability).




a government official decides controversies or exercises discretion,
neither he nor the government should be liable for his actions.84
By equating judicial with non-judicial activities, such an argument
goes too far. The judge's immunity arises from generations of judi-
cial professionalism, ingrained with a tradition of restraint.85 While
not wholly perfect, judges work within a balanced system of personal
self-control and appellate review. All bureaucrats, on the other hand,
do not necessarily have the same tradition of thoughtful, constrained
analysis in their decisionmaking processes. 86 On the contrary, a pri-
mary reason for creating quasi-judicial agencies is expediency. Thus
judicial and quasi-judicial actions are not pari materia, and do not
deserve the same level of immunity. A municipal employee normally
wields less discretion than a judge. Consequently, a municipal ad-
ministrator may be fairly held to a standard of honest, non-negligent
performance of his duties.87 Therefore, the first discretionary immu-
nity justification, fairness, fails.
A legislature drafting a Tort Claims Act should set limits on tort
immunity that reflect the level of discretion required of various offi-
cials. Some municipal functions do demand discretionary immu-
nity-for example, administrative agency quasi-courts. 88 By
contrast, high level, popularly elected officials should be answerable,
at least for policy choices, only to the voters.89 A limited grant of
84. Potter, supra note 18, at 198. As many as nine reasons have been given for the
traditional immunity of judges: 1) avoidance of extra litigation; 2) prevention of un-
due influence on judges through fear of suit; 3) assurance that persons of means and
property will accept judicial appointments; 4) preservation of judicial independence;
5) guarantee of finality; 6) avoidance of biased judges by change of venue, new trial,
or prospectively, reversal; 7) recognition that judges owe no duty to parties, preclud-
ing any cause of action; 8) creation of a rule which protects the architects of the im-
munity; and 9) recognition of the judge's special position-their judgments should be
accepted. Jennings, supra note 58, at 271-72.
The weak link between judicial immunity and rationales for quasi-judicial or ad-
ministrative immunities is exemplified by over-inclusive statements such as, "Govern-
mental liability for judicial or quasi-judicial action is unthinkable. No one could ever
argue seriously that reversal of a trial judge on appeal should give rise to a cause of
action in tort against the state." Potter, supra note 18, at 198.
85. Gray, Private Wrongs of Public Serrants, 47 CAL. L. REV. 303, 323 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as Gray]; Jennings, supra note 58, at 270.
86. Gray, supra note 85, at 323; Jennings supra note 58, at 270.
87. Gray, supra note 85, at 323.
88. See W. PROSSER, supra note 14, at 988-89.
89. See K. DAvis, supra note 21, at § 25.17 (suggesting that damage suits cannot
adequately correct negligent errors affecting thousands of people). See also McHenry
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immunity can protect those officials while retaining municipal liabil-
ity for the actions of low-level administrators.9"
The line drawing required here necessarily involves considerations
of public policy and the general welfare, a more proper legislative
role.9 ' The strict limiting of immune activities to specified narrow
fields92 will, of course, make it easier for the injured to be compen-
sated. This result would achieve the same protection or compensa-
tion for the person inadvertently injured by a governmental tort as
tort law presently protects the person injured by a private tortfeasor.
The second rationale states that the threat of suit and judicial re-
view of the decisionmaking process will dampen the enthusiasm of
the public servant.93 We should hesitate, this argument runs, to stifle
municipal employees' enthusiasm, creativity and innovation.94 Yet
non-govermental employees often make similar decisions without the
benefit of tort immunity. Why then does the municipal government
need protection? Governmental decisionmaking requires administra-
tors to enter into highly vulnerable transactions for which there is no
v. Sneer, 56 Iowa 649, 10 N.W. 234 (1881) (defendants, mayor and city councilmen,
are "amenable only to the public").
90. See notes 93-98 and accompanying text infra.
91. See note 76 supra.
92. The legislature should separate the various governmental employee categories
into liable and immune groupings. Easily, the categorization can immunize all judi-
cial and quasi-judicial positions as well as all elected officials. At the municipal level,
there would be little need to create immunities for any lower positions. See notes 93-
98 and accompanying text infra.
93. See C. RHYNE, W. RHYNE & S. ELMSDORF, TORT LIABILITY AND IMMUNITY
OF MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS 340 (1976) (protection for discretionary acts is necessary for
"efficient and zealous operation of municipal government.").
94. See W. PROSSER, supra note 14, at 987-92. Cf. Lipman v. Brisbane Elem.
School Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 224, 359 P.2d 465, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1961) (court implies that
liability for exercise of discretion may impair free exercise of administrative author-
ity).
This Note discusses governmental tort liability rather than the personal liability of
any individual employee. Under most Tort Claims Acts, the employee is fully indem-
nified by the municipal employer. That does not mean, however, that employees
have no fear of tort suits. An adverse judgment will certainly affect an employee's job
efficiency ratings, promotion opportunities, reputation and feeling of personal respon-
sibility. One author suggests that these factors will provide sufficient restraints on
governmental employees to provide the deterrent factor of tort theory. Comment,
Government Immunity Unavailable to Caiffornia State Agencies Except in Some Cases
of Discretionary Acts, 46 MINN. L. REv. 1143, 1151 (1962). Yet these considerations




civil counterpart.95 These activities fall into two basic categories:
usual, day-to-day decisions, and occasional long-range projections.
The latter activities, such as comprehensive land use planning, fiscal
management, and social welfare programs, could produce unforeseen
results with staggering tort damages.96 But when viewed from a tort
law perspective, this very lack of foreseeability will defeat a tort
claim.9 7 The foreseeability test would also apply to shorter range ac-
tivities. Since these decisions are more susceptible to reasoned, calcu-
lated decisionmaking, they require no more of the municipal
employee than is expected from the business employee. Therefore,
traditional tort concepts such as foreseeability provide a sufficient so-
lution.9
95. These activities include planning and maintaining highways, providing police
and fire protection, establishing quarantines, taking life or limiting freedom, and in-
forming the public of imminent disaster-all subject to legitimate political pressures.
96. K. DAVIS, supra note 21, at §§ 25.11-25.13. Cf. Schwartz, Public Tort Liability
in France, 29 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1432, 1454 (1954). See, e.g., United States v. Kansas
City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950) (recovery for damages due to dam construc-
tion); Bullock v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 885 (1955) (recovery for damages due to
nuclear testing).
97. Professor Davis, without citation, suggests that chief executive officers and
major agency heads should not be held liable for their negligent consideration of
governmental policy. K. DAvIs, supra note 21, at § 25.11. While elected officials cer-
tainly should answer primarily to the electorate for errors in judgment, appointed
officials should arguably be liable for the foreseeable injuries of their actions. See
note 92 supra.
98. See generally Note, The Discretionary Exception and Municipal Tort Liabilio."
A Reappraisal, 52 MINN. L. REV. 1047 (1968).
This solution will answer some common objections to discretionary immunity. K.
DAVIS. supra note 21, at § 25.11, suggests that discretionary immunity for negligence
in lower-level governmental functions is unjust and should be extinguished. It is
more just to employ a forseeability test in long-range decisionmaking than to condi-
tion liability on some unusual tort rule inapplicable to decisionmaking.
Foreseeability is also a more manageable distinction in Ramos v. County of Ma-
dero, 4 Cal. 3d 685, 484 P.2d 93, 94 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1971). Here, the California
Supreme Court wrestled with the "semantic quicksand" of the California Tort Claims
Act's discretionary immunity provisions, 1963 CAL. STATS. ch. 1681, § I (currently
enacted as CAL. GOv'T. CODE § 820.2 (Deering 1973)). The defendant county welfare
office had required plaintiffs to work in order to receive benefits, a practice forbidden
by the applicable laws. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11200 (Deering 1969); CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 12500 (Deering 1969). The court, using a sound policy ration-
ale, found that the legislature had exercised the true discretionary decisionmaking,
and that there was no room left for any discretion by the county to determine, on its
own, the qualifications for welfare. Yet, no one in the litigation disputed that the
injuries sustained by "forced labor" in the grape fields were foreseeable. Should the
defendant county have even had an opportunity to argue the question of discretion
and thus possibly avoid liability for tortious conduct?
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For that reason, a Tort Claims Act need only establish that the acts
of the municipality or its agents will be held to the common law tort
standards, perhaps allowing for judicial consideration of the unique-
ness of the governmental defendant. This exposure will not create an
atmosphere any more dampening than that affecting private business
lives daily.
The third rationale supporting discretionary immunity holds that
judicial review of executive action threatens the separation of pow-
ers.99 However, the separation of powers doctrine is less vital at the
municipal stage than at the federal level since it is not a constitutional
issue. Municipal agencies' powers often cross over traditional lines of
tort immunity."° Moreover, local agency actions, at times quasi-ju-
99. See Haslund v. City of Seattle, 86 Wash. 2d 607, 617, 547 P.2d 1221, 1228
(1976), citing Evangelical United Brethren Church v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 246, 254, 407
P.2d 440, 444 (1965) ("[iliability cannot be imposed when condemnation of the acts or
omissions relied upon necessarily brings into question the propriety of governmental
objectives or programs [or of decisions made] for the advancement of government
objectives").
100. An example, originated by Professor Gray, supra note 85, at 324-25, will
illustrate: Suppose a municipal Board of Safety regulates taxi service. If a Board
employee wrongfully arrests a driver for a suspected violation he is held to a reason-
able standard. See, e.g., United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1930) (reason-
able standard applied to arresting officer in non-warrant arrest). If the Board
improperly prosecutes, the standard for malicious prosecution is a dishonest motive.
See, e.g., MacIntosh v. City of Denver, 98 Colo. 403, 55 P.2d 1337 (1936) (proof of
malice required in malicious prosection case). Should the Board wrongfully seize a
taxi, it may be liable in trespass or conversion. See, e.g., Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass.
540, 26 N.E. 100 (1891) (administrator found liable in conversion for seizure and
destruction of an allegedly diseased horse). Defamatory remarks made during Board
meetings are prima facie immune. See, e.g., Tatro v. Eshan, 335 A.2d 623, 726 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1975) (absolute privilege for statements made in quasi-judicial board meet-
ings); Rainier's Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms, 19 N.J. 552, 117 A.2d 889 (1975)
(competitor's statements before a licensing board are immune); Tanner v. Gault. 20
Ohio App. 243, 153 N.E. 124 (Ohio App. 1925) (County Commissioners' statements in
proceedings are immune). See also Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606. 613-22
(1971) (United States Senator discussing classified materials on the Senate floor is
immune). If charged with improperly denying a license application, errors are held to
a good faith standard. See, e.g., Aiken v. City of Miami, 65 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1953)
(expression of good faith standard); Amperse v. Winslow, 75 Mich. 228,42 N.W. 821,
826 (1889) (denial of liquor license held to good faith standard); Rottcamp v. Young,
15 N.Y.2d 831, 835, 205 N.E.2d 866, 868, 257 N.Y.S.2d 944, 946 (1965) (Burke, J.,
dissenting) (denial of license cannot be for malicious, corrupt, dishonest, or bad faith
reasons).
This illustration of the executive, legislative and judicial activities of one adminis-
trative body exemplifies the difficulties encountered when discretionary immunity is




dicial or quasi-legislative, defy easy categorization under a separation
of powers scheme.10' However, another valid reason may exist for
separation.
Judicial review of social or fiscal administrative actions may im-
properly replace political decisionmaking with legal decisionmaking.
In Pratt v Robinson,'0 2 the court refused to interfere with a discre-
tionary decision of the Rochester, New York, School Board. An in-
jured student claimed that the Board's decision to discharge school
bus passengers several blocks from their homes breached the school's
duty to protect the children. In denying the cause of action, the court
properly left that type of decisionmaking with the municipal agency.
A court that restricts its review to the negligence issue, without ruling
on the correctness of a municipal decision, preserves the separation of
powers.1 13 A well-drafted Tort Claims Act can make this distinction,
allowing judicial review only of the means of agency action and leav-
ing the technical questions to agency experts.' 4
B. Legislative Determination o/Approach
The California Tort Claims Act,' 5 described as "closed-ended,"10 6
reestablishes general immunity with an extensive list of exceptions.
munity theories result in a maze ofjudicial standards for municipal employees' liabil-
ity.
101. Gray, supra note 85, at 324-25. See also E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 6, at
§ 21.296.
102. 39 N.Y.2d 554, 349 N.E.2d 849, 384 N.Y.S.2d 749 (1976).
103. See Kennedy & Lynch, supra note 5, at 180.
104. State enactments and subsequent case law employ a variety of means to cre-
ate or minimize discretionary immunity. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 820.2 (Deer-
ing 1973) and Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968)
(creates a *subsequent negligence' rule, that acts which follow discretionary decisions
may be ministerial); 1977 ME. LEGIS. SERV. ch. 578, § 8103 (re-establishes general
immunities, specifically listing immunity for performance or failure to perform discre-
tionary acts); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 82-4328, 4329, 4330 (Supp. 1977) (estab-
lishes immunity for legislative, judicial and gubernatorial acts), N.M. STAT. ANN. § 5-
14-2-B (Supp. 1976) (abolishes all governmental-proprietary distinctions, establishing
concepts of duty and the reasonable prudent person's standard of care.); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 4.96.010 (1962 & Supp. 1977) and Evangelical United Brethren Church
v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 246, 407 P.2d 407, 445 (1965) (creates a four-part test to narrow
discretionary immunity: 1) the activity must involve a basic governmental policy or
program or objective; 2) the activity must be essential to that policy, program, or
objective; 3) the act in question must involve the exercise of a basic policy evaluation
or judgment; and 4) the government agency must be acting within the scope of its
authority).
105. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815 (Deering 1973). See, e.g., Ramos v. County of Ma-
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In contrast, Oregon's act' 7 is "open-ended,"' 8 making all municipal
activities subject to liability except for those functions specifically ex-
empted. In view of principles of statutory construction, this differ-
ence in approach can be significant. Since statutes in derogation of
sovereignty traditionally are construed narrowly,"°9 courts will view
"closed-ended" acts conservatively, in favor of immunity. Under the
"open-ended" approach courts may rule that, given the absence of
general immunity, a narrow statutory construction is inapplicable. "0
This has been the result in Oregon and California."' To a legislature
seeking to protect its municipalities, a "closed-ended" approach of-
fers obvious advantages. On the other hand, an "open-ended"
scheme more closely follows the modem equitable trend requiring
governments to redress their torts. 1
2
dera, 4 Cal. 3d 685, 484 P.2d 93, 94 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1971) (holding liability is the rule,
immunity the exception).
106. Lansing, supra note 70, at 359.
107. OR. REv. STAT. § 30.260 (1975). See Pickett v. Washington County, 31 Or.
App. 1263, -, 572 P.2d 1070, 1072-73 (1977).
108. See Lansing, supra note 70, at 359.
109. id at 359-60.
110. Statutory construction problems may also arise under the closed-ended ap-
proach. When a court must decide if an activity, very close to one of the enumerated
liabilities on the list but not precisely identical, is to be immune, the maxim eapressio
unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of one excludes all others) may lead to a
narrow view of the liability. Moreover, a court finding this construction unsatisfac-
tory might look to prior governmental-proprietary distinctions for authority, a regres-
sive approach in light of the legislative closed-ended prescription. See Comment, The
Colorado Governmental Immunity Act: A Prescription for Regression, 49 DEN. L.J.
567, 586-87 (1973).
111. Sava v. Fuller, 249 Cal. App. 2d 281, 284, 57 Cal. Rptr. 312, 313 (1967)
(clearly setting out the government's immunity priority unless excepted in the statute).
Accord, Universal By-Products, Inc. v. City of Modesto, 43 Cal. App. 3d 145, 154. 117
Cal. Rptr. 525, 531 (1974) (the Code's immunity provisions are superior to its liability
provisions).
Swanson v. Coos County, 4 Or. App. 587, 590, 481 P.2d 375, 377 (197 1) (the general
rule is liability unless limited by statute). Accord, Weaver v. Lane County, 10 Or.
App. 281, 292, 499 P.2d 1351, 1356 (1972) (general governmental liability is the rule
under the act).
See also Holt v. Utah State Road Comm'n, 511 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1973) (governmen-
tal immunity is the rule with listed liabilities construed narrowly in favor of the state).
112. See E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 6, at § 53.02 (the municipal doctrine is con-
trary to the precept that liability should follow tortious conduct). See also Molitor v.
Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959); Merrill
v. City of Manchester, 114 N.H. 722, 332 A.2d 378 (1965) (both cases holding that





Tort Claims Acts may include a number of methods to limit plain-
tiffs' recoveries. Many states require that prospective plaintiffs give
notice to the government agency they intend to sue, usually within a
short time span.' 13 A sixty- or ninety-day limit for notice ensures
that municipalities can fully investigate an alleged cause of action.
Legislative limits on damage awards offer another safeguard to
municipalities. Limits from as low as $100 to $300,000 or more, are
common, 114 as are limits set by the city's insurance coverage." 5 Op-
ponents of damage limitations argue that the limits fail to reflect dif-
fering abilities to pay between major cities and minor hamlets,116
and, moreover deny deserving claimants full compensation. States
should adopt sliding scale damage limits to reflect municipalities' va-
rying size and capacity to absorb the costs of tort suits." 7
D. Restrictions Within Control of the Municipality
Faced with tort liability, a prudent city manager can minimize his
city's tort exposure. Within three general categories-insurance
management, risk evaluation and administrative and procedural
113. See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 615A.5 (1973) (requires notice within 60 days
to enjoy 2-year statute of limitations, or must commence suit, without notice, within
90 days); TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-1003 (1971) (requires notice within 90 days for inju-
ries sustained from defect in street or sidewalk).
114. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 30.265 (1975) (retains prior statutory immunities
and limits such at $100 maximum recovery for injury from sidewalk defects). See
also Lansing, supra note 70, at 367.
In contrast, the Montana limits are $300,000 per individual, MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 82-4334 (Supp. 1977).
115. Compare 1977 ME. LEGIS. SERV. § 8105 (general tort liability ceiling of
$30,000) with 1977 ME. LEGIS. SERV. § 8116 (purchase of insurance of higher maxi-
mum coverage supersedes § 8105 limit).
116. Van Alstyne, supra note 5, at 972 n.369. See Kennedy & Lynch, supra note
5, at 180.
117. Using another mode of restriction, the legislature can prohibit exemplary
and punitive damages on the theory that the government cannot be "punished" or
made example of for deterrent effect. See, e.g., Fisher v. City of Miami, 172 So.2d
455 (Fla. 1965); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-22 (1968). However, where malice can be
proven, these remedies may have their place in a Tort Claims Act. See Nixon v.
Oklahoma City, 555 P.2d 1282, 1285 (Okla. 1976) (city not liable for exemplary dam-
ages "unless citizens of the governmental unit are in some sense real participants in
the wrongful conduct"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-03.2 (Supp. 1977) ($25,000
damages limit per person against political subdivisions except for punitive or exem-
plary dages "caused by willful or malicious conduct").
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remedies-the manager can guard against large outlays for tort judg-
ment.
1. Insurance Management
Although municipalities have long used insurance, I" a history of
inadequate controls and uninformed purchases indicates inefficient
municipal utilization of the insurance dollar.' The solution lies in
gaining control of the situation through an insurance management
program. °20 Large cities, 121 for example, may may choose between
118. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 21-37-37 (1975) (authorizing municipal insur-
ance purchases). Georgia, for example, holds to traditional immunity doctrines ex-
cept for implying waiver on the purchase of insurance. Davis v. City of Macon, 122
Ga. App. 665, 178 S.E.2d 557 (1970); GA. CODE § 69-301 (1967).
There are four reasons why a city might purchase insurance although immune from
tort suit: 1) By purchasing general liability coverage, the city can obtain the insurer's
services to defend all suits; 2) If the status of the immunity doctrine is uncertain, the
risk of abrogation falls on the insurer, 3) In states providing for waiver of immunity
with an insurance prupose, insuring protects injured citizens; 4) Insurance may pro-
tect personally liable employees from personal liability. Note, Municipal Tort Liabil-
ity Purchase of Liabili&y Insurance as a Waiver of Immunit; 18 Wyo. L. J. 220, 229
(1964).
119. A National Institute of Municipal Law Officers study found ineffective utili-
zation of insurance dollars. C. RHYNE, W. RHYNE & S. ELMSDORF, TORT LIABILITY
AND IMMUNITY OF MUNICIPAL OFFICERS 340-42 (1976). Many municipalities could
not identify their premium costs and few utilize cost saving deductibles. Id
Further, some cities purchasing practices violated state law. In Missouri, many cit-
ies may be in violation of the Missouri Anti-Trust Law, Mo. REV. STAT. § 416.011
(1978). A city may restrain trade by practices which a) successively award insurance
purchases to the same firm absent a clear showing of the reasonableness of this prac-
tice, b) awarded insurance contracts to local insurance agents only, or c) allowed only
locals to bid. Kooistra, Risk Management, 41 Mo. MUNICIPAL REV., No. 12, 13-14
(1976).
In another Missouri study, 50% of the city administrators surveyed had no knowl-
edge of their loss experiences, 89% were unaware of the extent of their risk exposure,
and more than 5% had no insurance manager to administer their insurance program.
Id. at 14.
120. Pfennigstorf, Government Risk Management in Public Policy and Legislation:
Problems and Options, 1977 AM. BAR FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 255, 256 [hereinaf-
ter cited as Pfennigstorfl. The term "insurance management" encompasses two ele-
ments of risk management, the systematic analysis of risk exposure and
implementation of data systems designed to keep managers knowledgeable of the risk
situation. The other elements are the design of methods to optimize risk retention
and risk trade-off, and a program of risk prevention. Id
121. The smaller city which cannot provide a full-time insurance expert can hire a
consultant, or participate in a buying group with other cities when allowed by state
law. See, e.g., CAL. COV'T CODE § 990.8 (Deering 1973). An alternative is to partici-




purchasing commercial coverage 122 or self-insuring. 123 Often a com-
bination of these techniques is most cost effective. A city may self-
insure for small damage claims payable out of the operating budget
while purchasing insurance against the threat of large claims. A city
may further cut costs by selecting insurance with a designed maxi-
mum coverage, above which the city will "take its chances"'124 and
finance any extraordinary judgment through bond issues1 25 or special
tax levies.' 2 6
departments which control the state's insurance purchases and liability problems,
only a few extend these services to the municipalities. Pfennigstorf, supra note 120, at
267-73. These states rarely do more than authorize municipalities to set up similar
offices. Id Accord, IND. CODE ANN. § 18-4-7-4 (Burns 1974) (makes municipal
purchasing agents responsible for their own insurance purchases). Utilization of the
state's services would eliminate procurement problems as well as lower municipal
administrative costs. Pfennigstorf, supra note 120, at 303.
Some states create a centralized purchasing act for local governments. See, e.g.,
NEV. REV. STAT. § 332.115(l)(e) (1975). COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-30-402(3) (1973),
makes the state's risk management office's services available to small government
units. Wisconsin's state-wide municipal fire insurance program, Wis. STAT. ANN.
§§ 605.01-605.30 (1973), experienced great savings. In the years from 1934 through
1973, the effective rates of premiums was 50% lower than it would have been through
individual purchases. For the years 1961-1971, no premiums had to be collected at all
and yet during that period the insurance department was able to return $11,500,000 of
excess to the state general fund. Pfennigstorf, supra note 120, at 306.
122. Letter to author from the Pennsylvania Department of Insurance, dated Feb-
ruary 28, 1978, stating that insurance is available although the state has no legislative
protection. But see St. Louis Globe-Democrat, December 2, 1977, § N, at 1, col. 4,
reporting statements made by concerned city administrators which claim that insur-
ance will be unavailable at any cost in a government-liable environment. These ad-
ministrators expressed fear and concern for municipal financial health in the wake of
the Missouri Supreme Court's abrogation of municipal immunity. Further evidence
of insurability problems is expressed in a letter to author from James S. Kemper &
Co. This insurance broker states that the demise of governmental immunity, coupled
with rising social expectations and increased judgments, contributes to many insurers
refusal to consider insuring municipalities. Apparently, for some insurers, the risks
are too great to warrant investment of insurer capital in these lines when it can be
placed elsewhere more profitably. Some companies are refusing to insure for specific
high risks resulting from faulty design, advertising or printed material prepared by or
developed by the municipality. Hencke, Oregon's Governmental Tort Liability Law
from a National Perspective, 48 OR. L. REV. 95, 118-20 (1968).
123. See generally Pfennigstorf, supra note 120, at 281-85.
124. Such a system is advantageous since excessive judgments occur less fre-
quently from municipal budget cycles. Id at 282.
125. E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 975.2 (Deering 1973); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 82-4335(d) (Supp. 1977).
126. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-11 (Supp. 1977); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 82-
4335(c) (Supp. 1977).
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2. Risk Evaluation
Risk management goes beyond insurance procurement, however.
Municipalities should make resource allocation choices concerning
trade-offs between the social utilities of their programs (such as the
advantages of municipal swimming pools or craft shops) and their
costs in terms of tort liability exposure. In certain situations the
potential financial burden will so outweigh the social benefit as to
compel elimination of the program. If the function is of significant
social value but marginally budgeted, a legislative exemption from
liability may be warranted.'2 7
3. Administrative and Procedural Remedies
Finally, a city can initiate an administrative mechanism to keep
tort claims from getting to court while still providing for compensa-
tion of the injured. A few states utilize imaginative dispute resolution
mechanisms which, in essence, arbitrate tort and other claims.' 2 '
While this system should be separate from the department charged
with the tortious conduct, even the smallest of cities can set up a pro-
gram to hear local complaints. The city can negotiate a settlement
and avoid expensive litigation at a small administrative cost.
CONCLUSION
The evolution of sovereign liability is an excellent example of the
growth of state law. A social goal of protection for injured citizens is
closer to fruition. Common law evolutions, however, leave unsettled
gaps and uncertainty. Clarity can be achieved by a legislative entry
into this developing field of law. The informed policymaking inher-
ent in the legislative process establishes it as the proper forum for
solution of the municipal tort problem. The legislature can utilize
fact-finding methods such as hearings to encourage full discussion
and evaluation of the interests to be protected. In balancing these
interests, the legislature should eschew blanket discretionary immu-
nities and create a system that protects deserving claimants without
subjecting municipalities to unlimited tort liability.'2 9
127. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 85, § 3-106 (1965) (exempting park activities
from municipal liability). See generally Van Alstyne, supra note 5, at 972-73.
128. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 935.2 (Deering 1973).
129. An off-shoot of this growth is the extension of liability to other municipal
activities. For example, the Illinois Supreme Court abrogated the doctrine of munici-




789 (1974) (governmental tort liability rationale used to allow garnishment of munici-
pal employee's wages). See also Monell v. Department of Social Services, 98 S. Ct.
2018 (1978) (municipalities liable for civil rights violations under federal law, overrul-
ing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)).
Not every legislative solution to the discretionary immunity problem clarifies mu-
nicipal tort law. For example, the Colorado legislature apparently opted for the dis-
credited governmental-proprietary distinction. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-10-103(3)(a),
24-10-106, 24-10-108 (1973) (immunity for operation of public facilities in employees'
performance of duties "vested in them by law."). If the court must determine which
activities vest in employees by law, it must use the traditional governmental-proprie-
tary doctrine. Comment, The Colorado Governmental Immunity Act: A Prescription
for Regression, 49 DEN. L.J. 567, 586-87 (1973). Similarly Utah's Governmental Im-
munity Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-3 (1968), makes a municipality immune in
activities arising in the performance of governmental functions. See Note, The Utah
Governmental Immunity Act: An Analysis, 1967 UTAH L. REV. 120, 128-29 (1967).
Moreover, unless Tort Claims Acts clearly identicate the manner in which the acts
should be adjudicated, judicial regression to old common law doctrines may result.
E.g., Young v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 541 P.2d 191, 193 (Okla. 1975) (notwith-
standing a state Tort Claims Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 11, § 1751 (1971), the court used a
traditional ministerial and governmental (discretionary) immunity test.)
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34 (28 J) 3 8 6
1. This list contains the states which follow traditional governmental immunity
rules, but provide that an insurance purchase constitutes a waiver of that immunity.
2. A "J" indicates the change to liability was made judicially.
3. Arkansas changed to liability judicially and was changed back to immunity
legislatively. See note 8 supra.
4. Missouri abrogated its immunity for municipalities and the legislature reim-
posed immunity with an optional insurance waiver. See note 8 supra.
Adapted from RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895A (Tent. draft No. 19.
1973), as up-dated by the author.
J Ala.
2
J Alas.
J Ariz.
J Cal.
J Colo.
J Fla.
Hawaii
J Idaho
J Ill.
J Ind.
Iowa
J Ky.
J La.
J Me.
J Mich.
J Minn.
J Mont.
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